INTRODUCTION

A. Need for Information
In aviation, medicine, nuclear power plant operation, and even mountaineering, near misses are treated as an important source of knowledge. Each field has a formalized and structured near-miss reporting and analysis system. These systems give practitioners, researchers, and regulators many of the benefits of accident investigations without the human or economic costs of those accidents. In cybersecurity, we do not have such a system, but we do have a lot of accidents. Could a near-miss program be helpful? What would it look like? What issues do we need to address to bring it about?
The proliferation of technology provides consumers immeasurable benefits, but also creates great vulnerability. In recent years, we have seen explosive growth in the number of damaging cyber-attacks. 1 2017 alone saw worms and malware such as WannaCry, Petya, NotPetya, Bad Rabbit, and the massive Equifax breach, among many others. 2 Uber was the target of several lawsuits within days after disclosing a breach and (apparent) ransom payment. 3 Currently, there is no mechanism in place to facilitate understanding of these threats, or their commonalities.
While information regarding the causes of major breaches may occasionally become public after the fact, what is lacking is an aggregated data set which could be analyzed for research purposes. Collecting data about such incidents is difficult because of liability concerns. Moreover, there is a linguistic quagmire in the definitions of breach, incident, and hack, all of which are intimately interconnected with reporting mandates and liability concerns. We propose here to stay outside that debate, and instead look to "near misses." We consider a near miss to be an event short of a full incident, because some controls function as intended and contain the damage. 4 For example, if a person clicks on a link in a phishing email, and the phishing site has been taken down, then that event would be a near miss. 5 Research into near misses could provide clues as to trends in attacks, the effectiveness of controls, and avoidable mistakes made on the part of operators, among other valuable data.
B. Mandatory Incident Reporting/Investigation has Challenges
There is an important distinction to be made between reporting on vulnerabilities and reporting on incidents, and we limit our 4. See discussion infra Section I.C. 5. See discussion infra Section I.C. discussion to the latter. 6 One possible regime for gathering such information would be to require disclosure of incidents, and to create a public investigations board which would analyze incidents and issue public reports on them. 7 Mandatory reporting and investigations would result in better data collection. 8 The regime would also cause firms to internalize, to some extent, the externalities of security. 9 However, there are challenges that have made a mandatory reporting regime difficult to implement 10 , and there are claims that such a regime would be more costly than beneficial. 11 Microsoft points out that mandatory reporting may cause firms to divert resources from more effective security measures to complying with inefficient and unnecessary reporting requirements. 12 Additionally, the lack of clearly defined terms in this area makes determining what does and doesn't qualify as a reportable event challenging. 13 Mandatory reporting regimes are often one-way, with the government requiring private actors to disclose information, but failing to reciprocate. 14 Because private actors will err on the side of compliance, they are likely to overreport, causing high-value data to become buried and less easy to identify. 15 And to ensure compliance, private actors' legal counsel may discourage disclosure to anyone other than the government 13. Id. 14. 15. Id. authority. 16 As such, if a mandatory reporting regime is crafted incorrectly, it may result in an increase in social cost. 17 
C. The Aviation Sector Offers Robust Models
An alternative is a voluntary reporting scheme, possibly combined with an incentive scheme, whereby organizations who experience a near miss would file a report encompassing important details of the event to some neutral party. That party would encode the data and place it in a database, perform analyses, and issue reports. This database could then be used both by researchers and by the industry as a whole. People could learn what works, what does not work, and where the weak spots in security are.
The adoption of such a voluntary confidential information sharing system has proved valuable to the aviation industry. The most notable, and one of the earliest, is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) housed within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 18 The ASRS is a system which collects voluntary information regarding near misses in aviation. 19 This data is then analyzed to identify weaknesses in safety systems, and possibly to identify means to prevent similar incidents occurring in the future, thus improving the safety of air travel overall. 20 The ASRS is successful for multiple reasons: First, it recognizes that to understand "why people did what they did, the best approach is to just ask [them] ." 21 Adequately anonymizing the data, and ensuring confidentiality and security of the data encourages reporters to be more open and honest in their responses. 22 Additionally, NASA is a well-respected scientific agency without any enforcement interests, which reduces concerns that a reporter risks drawing unwanted attention to themselves. 23 And the FAA, for its part, treats reporting to the ASRS as "indicative of a constructive attitude" and will include that in its determination of penalties if incidents are reported in a timely manner. 24 can be quite severe, including revoking a license and ending a career in aviation, and so mitigating those penalties becomes quite important.
A clear definition of what constitutes an accident allows the FAA to investigate accidents, while rewarding the reporting of near-miss events to NASA. Moreover, "Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 C.F.R.) part 91, section 91.25 prohibits the use of any reports submitted to NASA under the ASRS (or information derived therefrom) in any disciplinary action, except information concerning criminal offenses or accidents that are covered under paragraphs 7a(1) and 7a(2)." 25 These features have led to a successful program. ASRS' intake of reports, which averaged 400 reports per month in its inaugural year, has now grown to an average of over 7,600 reports per month. 26 These reports are also used to generate safety alerts, with the underlying problem being addressed in 56% of instances where an alert was issued, and action taken as a direct result of the alert in 22% of instances. 27 The database of de-identified reports is also searchable and open, handling over 1,500 queries per month. 28 And lastly, the ASRS publishes a monthly newsletter, Callback, aiming to provide educational safety information to the aviation community. 29 They are sufficiently valued that the U.S. ASRS program has been emulated in the aviation regulations of many other countries. 30 In addition to ASRS, airlines tend to operate internal "aviation safety programs," some of which feed into other cross-organizational safety programs, such as the FAA's Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) System. 31 Voluntary information sharing regimes are also frequently employed in other industries. The Federal Railroad Administration operates a Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C 3 RS). 32 As with ASRS, the C 3 RS allows for confidential reporting of unsafe conditions 25. Id by stake holders, which in turn allows for changes in rail transportation which make the system safer. 33 A similar system can be found for medical devices with the Food and Drug Administration, and for nuclear power plants in the IAEA. 34 Some, but not all, of these schemes involve explicit incentive structures. 35 Similar programs for near-miss reporting exist in other fields, ranging from medicine 36 to mountaineering. 37 
D. Our Proposal
We propose the creation of a similar system for cybersecurity near misses. When there is a near miss, companies and their employees would be encouraged to file a report with some organization. As is done for aviation, this organization would review the report for completeness (and solicit additional data if necessary), anonymize it, publish it in a database, and analyze the reports and data for actionable results. We call this system a Cyber Security Reporting System, CSRS, in homage to the ASRS.
There are some obvious challenges. The first, of course, is the reluctance of corporate executives to disclose details of an event, be it incident or near miss. They may be afraid of liability, 38 40 or even disclosing details of their network and its weaknesses to other attackers.
A second challenge is actually setting up the reporting system. Apart from the issue of who would run it or pay for it, actually handling the reports is challenging. It's hard to preserve necessary details while still obscuring the identity of the reporting organization; it's also difficult to protect individual employees from fear of possible retaliation.
Still, this seems to us to be the best approach to gathering and analyzing this very important data. Right now, it is difficult for defenders to learn what has or hasn't worked; voluntary reporting seems more feasible for learning useful defensive lessons than other approaches. This paper will first address both the civil and regulatory liability companies face under the current regime, and how our current lack of clear definitions make navigating such liabilities difficult. It will then turn to current practices and the rationales behind them, how better information can enable scientific work to improve those practices, and how regulators can encourage experimentation and learning. Lastly, this paper will address why action is necessary, what specifically needs to be done, and explains why the proposal presented in this paper is the best solution.
I. LIABILITY CONCERNS INHIBIT LEARNING
The continuing failure to adequately develop cybersecurity has prompted calls for a new regulatory framework and government intervention. 41 42 As a result, companies may be subject to a wide range of both regulatory (statutory) and civil liability-unfair or deceptive practices, breach of contract, negligence, unjust enrichment, and negligent misrepresentation among others-for failure to adequately protect data. 43 Particularly, enforcement and civil actions may be brought in the U.S. by the individuals about whom data was lost, other businesses impacted by the breach, shareholders of the company, government agencies such as the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), state Attorneys General, or the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Congress may even initiate inquiries into the breach. 44 Given the potential for liability, companies try to say as little as possible about issues, incidents, or breaches which they experience. They also have a complex set of tradeoffs to make about how to defend themselves. They need to set a level of investment and then allocate those resources to both offer technical protection, and to do so in a way that can be justified in front of a jury. As we will explain in Section II, this is very difficult.
A. Civil Liability
Civil liability from a data breach will often come in the form of contract damages or tort damages. 45 In those cases, a plaintiff will attempt to show that an implied contract existed to safeguard the data, that the company was negligent, or negligently misrepresented the level of security it used to protect data. 46 While data-breach claims are can't fix this because neither the buyer and the seller care,' he said. 'Until now, we've given programmers the right to code the world that they saw fit. We need to figure out the policy. ' 46. See id. (stating that savvy companies will often seek to protect themselves by wording contracts such that the standard for data protection is set at the minimum that applicable laws allow).
often difficult to prove due to the lack of evidence of an actual harm, some circuit courts have allowed standing in cases of future harm. 47 Other circuit courts reasoned that the 'threat of future harm' is too speculative to proceed however, 48 resulting in a circuit split with plaintiffs in at least one case petitioning the Supreme Court to resolve the issue of standing, albeit unsuccessfully. 49 Regardless, a general plaintiff friendly trend is increasing the number and cost of settlements from data breaches. 50 Even with the improved chance of standing in some courts, private parties still face an uphill battle in proving injury after a breach, 51 and private actions remain relatively unsuccessful. 52 Indeed, an exceedingly low percentage of publicly reported breaches actually lead to a class action. 53 While typical consumers may still be unable to prove injury in data breach cases, the company's business partners who experience much more direct financial loss are more easily able to 47 53. ZETOONY ET AL., supra note 43, at 3 ("806 breaches were publicly reported during [2016] . . . . only 76 federal class action complaints were filed during the same timeframe, and these filings related to only 27 unique defendants" meaning only about 3.3% of such breaches led to class action litigation). prove standing. 54 Even so, if companies have contractually limited their liability from a cybersecurity incident, an injured party may only recover on certain contract claims and not negligence claims stemming from the breach. 55 These difficulties suggest that it is the regulatory liability for which companies should be most concerned.
There is also the chance that a mandatory liability regiment will be imposed through international agreement. A recent French government document makes exactly this suggestion: 56 Il semble donc pertinent de poser au niveau international un principe de responsabilité de sécurité des acteurs privés systémiques dans la conception, l'intégration, le déploiement et la maintenance de leurs produits et services numériques. Cette responsabilisation pourrait se traduire par une obligation pour les entreprises systémiques de garantir la sécurité à long terme de leurs produits numériques, notamment en fournissant des correctifs appropriés en cas de vulnérabilité. Le niveau de responsabilité doit être fixé en fonction du rôle et de la taille de l'acteur concerné et pourrait se présenter comme une obligation de moyens plus que de résultats.
(It therefore seems appropriate to establish at the international level a principle of safety responsibility for systemic private actors in the design, integration, deployment and maintenance of their digital products and services. This accountability could be translated into an obligation for systemic enterprises to ensure the long-term security of their digital products, including by providing appropriate fixes in case of vulnerability. The level of responsibility should be set according to the role and size of the actor concerned and could be an obligation of means rather than results.) 57 
B. Regulatory Liability
Enforcement actions stemming from a breach can be extremely costly to companies. Since its 2013 data breach, Target has reportedly spent over $200 million on legal fees and expenses, with settlements from suits by state Attorneys General rising to $18.5 million. 58 The recent Equifax breach has also caused a flurry of lawsuits-upwards of 200 class action suits, and investigations or suits by every state Attorney General-as well as investigations by the FTC, Congress, and the DOJ. 59 Equifax stands as an exemplar of the potential minefield of enforcement actions that can be brought following a data breach. We briefly discuss some of the government organizations involved in such enforcement actions to demonstrate the liability concerns that companies face.
The FTC has asserted some authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act to prevent unfair or deceptive practices in cybersecurity. 60 In its enforcement action against Wyndham Worldwide Corp ("Wyndham"), the FTC asserted that Wyndham was breached on three occasions within two years, exposing customer information which led to over $10.6 million in fraudulent charges. 61 The FTC asserted that Wyndham's security practices were unfair and exposed customer's data to theft by, among other things, failing to employ reasonable measures to detect and prevent unauthorized access to its network or conduct proper incident response procedures, allowing the hackers to use similar methods in each attack. 62 In a final settlement, Wyndham agreed to create a comprehensive information security program to protect cardholder data, and to conduct annual security audits and maintain safeguards in connections to its franchisees. to store payment information in clear readable text, used easily guessed passwords and usernames, had no firewalls to protect the system, allowed hotels to connect with out-of-date software, etc.).
Wyndham Settles FTC Charges it Unfairly Placed Consumers' Payment Card Information
at Risk, FTC (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/wyn dham-settles-ftc-charges-it-unfairly-placed-consumers-payment [https://perma.cc/X7U3-TY YE].
In another action, the FTC charged HTC America with failing to take reasonable steps to secure its mobile devices. 64 The final settlement requires HTC to patch vulnerabilities, establish a comprehensive security program, and undergo independent security assessments for the next 20 years. 65 Notably, there were no allegations of actual harm in that case. 66 The recent LabMD decision effectively recognizes the ability of the FTC to regulate cybersecurity, but requires the FTC provide greater specificity in issuing orders so that those charged with an unfair or deceptive practice may be on notice of how to remediate. 67 The result of FTC enforcement actions is that companies will face fines, and potentially more burdensome ongoing requirements.
Because there are no preemptive federal data breach laws, a company that is subject to a data breach also potentially faces a number of suits from state Attorneys General. Notably, the HITECH Act gave state Attorneys General the "authority to bring civil actions on behalf of their state residents to enjoin conduct and/or obtain damages for violations of the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules." 68 Moreover, each state has its own data breach law, further complicating the defense of a suit stemming from a breach exposing data from consumers in multiple states. 69 The exposure resulting from a data breach can be staggering. Massachusetts law, for example, allows a maximum penalty of five thousand dollars for each violation. Suggestive of the exposure companies face, the Equifax breach resulted in leaking of data on 143 million Americans. At $5,000 per violation, the cost could be as high as $700 billion from state action. 71 Companies with international footprints also face severe penalties in jurisdictions outside the United States. Chief among these is the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) promulgated by the European Commission which took effect in May of 2018. 72 The GDPR dramatically expanded liability for companies, for example, to data processors, rather than just data controllers. 73 Moreover, companies cannot escape liability by merely relocating their physical infrastructure outside of the EU because the GDPR, "applies directly to any entity that processes personal data about EU residents in connection with (i) the offer of goods or services in the EU; or (2) the monitoring of behavior in the EU." 74 Failure to comply with the GDPR can also be extremely costly to companies, amounting to fines of €10 million or 2% of global annual turnover (revenue) from the prior year for non-compliance with technical measures or €20 million or 4% of global annual turnover in the prior year for non-compliance with key provisions of the GDPR. 75 The evolution of data-breach litigation and corresponding laws suggests that companies should be extremely sensitive to the development of their cyber practices and that mere reputation harm is giving way to costly civil litigation and enforcement actions. Although private actions still lag in terms of likelihood of success, regulatory enforcement can subject companies to massive fines and corrective measures.
3135314045906944 (Hoofnagle strongly implies in a tweet that in California a "violation" is per person, "Uber will have direct liability if facts bear out. Total liability is # of nondisclosure * $2500 -whatever the judge thinks reasonable. My guess is in excess of $500mm. 
C. Defining Incidents and Near Misses
Given the potential legal minefield, it is important to take a step back and discuss the difference between an incident and a near miss, 76 so we can better understand the underlying incentives to share information.
Borrowing from the aviation industry's successes, we briefly sketch how defining incident and near miss works there. The aviation sector is comprehensively regulated by the FAA, and an aircraft accident is defined by law. 77 Near misses are defined as "when a person was able to avoid injury and/or illness, and when no property damage occurs" and that "documentation of near-misses is important for developing mishap prevention strategies." 78 Clear definitions of terms allows the FAA to say that near misses are events which are neither accidents nor crimes. The clear line between accident and near miss helps set minds at ease about reporting.
Generally, near-miss events occur when some controls function as intended, and others do not. This allows us to observe the failure of some controls and learn from those. Learning from near misses is something that safety engineers have long implemented in their practices. 79 Some define near misses as an "infrequent alarm or warning signal," cautioning that the definition cannot be too loose that near misses will be so common that they are ignored as "pesky nuisances." 80 The concept of learning from what did work is very important. This was a lesson learned during World War II. Studying combat damage to returned aircraft, the military tended to add armor in the places that showed more hits. An American statistician, Abraham Wald, reasoned that this was incorrect: the planes that had returned were those that had survived; hits in those places were thus less likely to be fatal. By contrast, planes hit in other areas were shot down; thus, those areas-ones that had not been hit in the surviving planes-were 76. The profusion of definitions made for trouble even in writing this paper, with disagreement between authors on which word to use, and when to use them. what needed armor. 81 A near-miss is thus the best thing to study: it represents not an attack that was easily deflected by common techniques, but one that just barely missed being successful, i.e., a serious danger point. 82 One model for understanding near-misses is Reason's Swiss Cheese model. 83 Controls are represented as multiple "slices of swiss cheese." As a problem progresses, it may either bounce off the cheese or go through a hole. If it hits cheese, it falls away "harmlessly" as a "near miss." Only if it goes through the holes in each piece of cheese can it cause harm. This allows us to use near-misses to understand control failures, even if no harm occurs, because at least one "slice" has prevented the problem from progressing. 84 In the cyber context, distinctions between a near-miss and an incident are not as clear, creating a perception that sharing information about what's going wrong may expose organizations to liability. As discussed above, there are many regulators and enforcers and many definitions for cyber incidents which they may cover. 85 For example, a computer security incident may be a "violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices." 86 Even though such definitions are designed with the best of intentions to include "imminent threat," and computer security policies, they nonetheless create a problem for sharing near-miss information. If "incident" includes "imminent threats", then prudent legal practice may dictate treating those "imminent threats" as potential focal points for investigation or lawsuit.
Most of the efforts around defining incidents are focused on expanding and creating inclusive definitions. If companies are unclear as to the effects of disclosure of incidents or near misses and how such disclosure can potentially harm companies in subsequent civil litigation, they will be less likely to share near-miss information. 87 It may be possible for expansive definitions of incident and near-miss to co-exist peacefully in situations where reports go to different places, 82. This also illustrates that the dichotomy of "near miss" or "incident" may be too constraining, and public policy or a CSRS may benefit from a third category which is damaging but not catastrophic. 87. See GERMANO & GOLDMAN, supra note 43, at 2. and incentives are structured as influence on regulatory judgement. Reporting could then be something that both creates no additional jeopardy, and reporting an incident as if it were a near-miss produces no substantial benefit. Regardless, clear definitions cannot help but reduce uncertainty.
James Reason, The Contribution of Latent Human Failures to the Breakdown of Complex
II. IMPROVE SCIENCE TO IMPROVE OUTCOMES
By observation, it is hard to secure systems. 88 We would like to be able to emulate the engineers who build bridges, and who assert that each new bridge will withstand the forces that will be brought to bear on it. 89 We'd like to be able to state that we have engineered in a safety factor, so even if our calculations are off, the bridge will not collapse. Neither the security of software nor computer operations have achieved an engineering discipline like that. We cannot describe the basic forces at work, the needed strengths of components, or assess a safety factor. 90 Engineers study both their practices and their outcomes. Their practices are the tasks, skills and methods that they bring to bear in a project, and the outcomes are the observed result of those practices.
In this section, we will discuss practices and outcomes that we believe are important to security and why, including: identifying what drives the selection of practices or controls in use today; determining how we assess the controls we're using, and how and what information is shared; and how new types of information flows could dramatically improve practices and outcomes.
A. What Security Practices and Outcomes are Important?
Organizations invest resources in information security practices, hoping to reduce the frequency and likelihood of incidents, which are a form of bad outcome. 91 Global spending on security products and 91. "The Framework enables organizations -regardless of size, degree of cybersecurity risk, or cybersecurity sophistication -to apply the principles and best practices of risk management to improving the security and resilience of critical infrastructure" and "Organizations can determine activities that are important to critical service delivery and can prioritize investments to maximize the impact of each dollar spent. Ultimately, the Framework is aimed at reducing and better managing cybersecurity risks."). NIST, FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 1-2 (2014), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurityframework-021214.pdf ("Other outcomes to avoid include systems not delivered, systems services is now approaching $100 billion. 92 In spite of these investments however, security incidents seem to be getting worse and more frequent. 93 Practitioners bemoan the difficulty of assessing risk to a granularity such as "very risky" or "not very risky," never mind quantifying risk. Such quantification is a precursor to being able to answer the question "does this practice or control change our risk?" Security practice in industry is driven by a mix of standards and a desire to innovate to defeat emergent attack techniques, with the majority of spending historically focused on compliance with standards. 94 (There are exceptions, of the "proving the rule" sort.) However, standards are lagging, and so some organizations invest in innovation of various sorts.
It is reasonable to think that before a control is added to a standard, someone rigorously assessed it for effectiveness. The assessment could be done by a standards body, or they could rely on someone else's rigorous assessment. Unfortunately, we have few ways to assess effectiveness, and their rigor is open to question. In the matter of D-Link, the FTC relied on "the OWASP top ten" vulnerability list as part of their determination of what constitutes "reasonable" security. 95 But the process for determining that top ten list has come under scrutiny with some questioning whether one of the elements in a new draft version is merely a "vendor pitch. 93. The U.S. does not mandate reporting of security incidents except in exceptional circumstances, and there is no centralized register of incidents which would allow us to authoritatively state that either the number or severity is rising. As required by FISMA, the U.S. Government does report on its own incidents. In the 2016 report, the Acting Federal Chief Information Security Officer says "the FY 2016 incident data is not comparable to prior years' incident data." Grant Schneider, Federal Cybersecurity: Administration Releases Annual Report on Agency Cyber Performance, FISMA, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ whitehouse.gov/files/briefing-room/presidential-actions/related-omb-material/FISMA _blog_v-7.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/RT8U-TQA4].
Warwick Ashford, Security Spending Not on Most-Effective Controls, Report Reveals,
COMPUTER WEEKLY (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252433722/ Security-spending-not-on-most-effective-controls-report-reveals ("The report notes that while in the past, compliance has been the primary driver for setting security spending priorities, the fear of the financial penalties from data breaches has taken over the top spot, with 39% citing it as the top stimulus for security spending, up from 35% a year ago. Overall, the standards process suffers from a variation of the difficulty of assessing risk, which is that when a new practice or control is suggested for a standard, it is hard to assess: if the control works (or in what circumstances it works); if the new control offers good return on invested effort; or if the control offers better or worse returns than other proposed controls.
The outcomes which are most noticeable today are "breaches" of control over personal information. Usually, but not always, they are disclosed because of breach disclosure laws and attendant publicity. 97 Other breaches are publicized because the attacker publicizes it by defacing a website, 98 using a Twitter account to say things derogatory to its owner, 99 or the data is leaked, for example, the Panama Papers. 100 Many incidents are not disclosed. 101 There are substantial disincentives to disclosure. 102 If you disclose penetrations, lawsuits follow, 103 and investigations by regulators or enforcement agencies may also follow. Penalties for failing to disclose breaches vary by state, with some states imposing penalties per failure to notify, per breach, or for knowing violations. 104 We do not here take a position on the , https://www.cio.com/article/2436102/infrastructure/most-retailerbreaches-are-not-disclosed-gartner-says.html ("In a new study based on interviews with 50 U.S. retailers, Gartner found that 21 of them were certain they had had a data breach. However, just three of the retailers had disclosed the incident to the public.") [https://perma.cc/E6GC-C5G4]. Security experts understand that measuring hidden data is hard, and that these numbers remain broadly indicative of the levels at which incidents are concealed or disclosed. As we were writing this, it came out that "Uber concealed 104. For example, Alaska has a "Civil penalty payable to state of up to $500 for each state resident who was not notified, except that the total civil penalty may not exceed $50,000"; Hawaii says, "Any business that violates any provision of this chapter shall be subject to penalties of not more than $2,500 for each violation." State Breach Notification Laws, FOLEY & LARDNER, LLP (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.foley.com/files/Publication/c31703ac-ee93-40a5-desirability of such penalties. The argument for a penalty is that without one, no one would take on the risks that accompany reporting a breach. The argument against is twofold: first, computers often behave oddly, and to attribute malice or recklessness to what might be randomness can be expensive; second, warnings are often vague. For example, "[i]n its initial contact with the DNC last fall, the FBI instructed DNC personnel to look for signs of unusual activity on the group's computer network, one person familiar with the matter said. DNC staff examined their logs and files without finding anything suspicious, that person said." 105 In this example case, is it fair to penalize the DNC for not finding anything suspicious? A system that balances these disincentives with incentives could substantially improve computer security.
We would like to reduce the number of important incidents in cyber, by increasing the predictability of those events, and reducing their impact. 106 Both of these goals are quantitative. Each requires some form of data gathering. Assessing the predictability of events can be done bottom-up, that is, how likely is this entity to suffer an event; or top-down, that is, out of this population, how many entities will suffer? Impact can also be quantified, by dollar losses, stock price losses, or estimating with other yardsticks. As long as the estimation methods are consistent, then we can assess whether the impact of However, the data which is used as input to those mechanisms is not standardized, shared, or scrutinized, and both authors would agree that their methods could work much better with better data. events is increasing or decreasing over time. 107 How many entities will suffer, and how badly they will suffer, depends on their practices and the effectiveness of those practices. As discussed above, this is hard to measure.
B. The Importance of Data
Today's information sharing can usefully be broken into "sharing" and "publication." Information is often shared, with rules about where it can be sent, and some of it, often relating to vulnerabilities, is then published and made available to all comers. But a great deal of data, including "indicators of compromise" 108 is never published. 109 Published information about vulnerabilities enables several valuable tasks. First, it can help to prioritize the application of fixes or patches. Second, it can help with finding variations or similar vulnerabilities. Third, the open publication of vulnerability information enables research in a variety of ways. 110 That research includes statistical analysis of vulnerability characteristics, and research into defensive techniques such as address space layout randomization.
Perhaps the best example of this research is the class of problems called "buffer overflows." 111 Knowledge of such problems were kept
Dan Geer, A Quant Looks at the Future: Extrapolation via Trend Analysis,
http://geer.tinho.net/geer.cerias.21iii07.pdf ("First, trend analysis is what a statistician will recommend when the underlying topic of interest is changing and the method of measuring it is uncertain. In such a circumstance, and so long as the measurement you do have can be applied consistently, the trend data can be relied on and it is what you need for decision support.") [https://perma.cc/Y5YB-HAXJ]. Most events are reasonably measurable, as the majority of costs are operational expenses in response, capital expenses for upgrades, onetime costs of notification, or impact to reputation/goodwill. There are events that are difficult to quantify, such as the leak of John Podesta's emails during the 2016 Presidential election, which is challenging because of scope. Are we to assess the damage to the Democratic National Committee, the impact on the election, or the impact of the election on the country? , which has been adopted by many others. These rules are so frequently invoked that it is not unusual in to hear something like "Tee-Ell-Pee red" in response to the question, "can I share that?" 109. Since the data is not published, it is hard to assess relative quantities. 110. Researchers are often hesitant to plan work whose initiation or publication includes needless uncertainty.
111. In buffer overflow attacks, an attacker sends a program more data than it is expecting, originally intended for what is known as an "input buffer." If the program does not detect and handle this situation, other areas of memory can be overwritten, with dire consequences. Conceptually, imagine a clerk writing down someone's name, but the name as given is so long that it doesn't fit in the box on a form and spills over into the "Official Use Only" section of the form. A carefully constructed overflow can install new computer code, as tribal knowledge for at least 25 years 112 before they were published in detail for others to learn from. Within a few years of the first detailed description, a systematic fix was developed. 113 Additional prominent examples include Hoare's Turing Lecture, in which he describes a choice to perform bounds checking in a 1960 compiler. 114 Each of these discussions chose not to describe the attack technique in depth, perhaps to avoid providing a "roadmap for attackers." However, attackers had their own roadmap. The 1988 Morris worm exploited a buffer overflow in fingerd 115 as one of its propagation mechanisms. 116 In 1996, a hacker known as Aleph One published a paper now recognized as seminal, "Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit." 117 The paper detailed the problem, and techniques for exploiting it to gain privileges beyond what the system designers intended. 118 114. C.A.R. Hoare, Lecture at Communications of the ACM: The Emperor's Old Clothes (Oct. 27, 1980) ("A consequence of this principle is that every occurrence of every subscript of every subscripted variable was on every occasion checked at run time against both the upper and the lower declared bounds of the array. Many years later we asked our customers whether they wished us to provide an option to switch off these checks in the interests of efficiency on production runs. Unanimously, they urged us not to-they already knew how frequently subscript errors occur on production runs where failure to detect them could be disastrous. I note with fear and horror that even in 1980, language designers and users have not learned this lesson. In any respectable branch of engineering, failure to observe such elementary precautions would have long been against the law."). 118. Generally, that was either an elevation from "not authorized to use the system" to "can run code on the system," or from "unprivileged and able to run code" to administrative privilege.
119. The publication dates appear slightly further apart, but note that the call for papers, 7 th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX, http://www.usenix.net/legacy/publications/ library/proceedings/sec98/cfp.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2018) [https://perma.cc/2JYC-TWXK], had a submission deadline of September, 1997, which was 10 months after the publication of Smashing the Stack, and that the paper has a full section of experimental results.
paper presents experimental results. 120 Even with the first version built, the team wanted to continue to improve Stackguard 121 In 1998, one author of this paper (Shostack) was an executive at an early vulnerability scanning company (Netect), and at a trade show, Cowan approached us to see if we could provide him with a feed of vulnerabilities which he could use to test StackGuard. 122 So even after the paper was published, there was a real engineering need for more and detailed information to test defensive mechanisms.
The endurance of problems like buffer overflows and the Morris worm are symptoms of a failure to learn from mistakes. Both were largely resolved when the attacks were described in depth to the public. Publishing such data is critical to improving the overall security of systems, and we need mechanisms to investigate, gather, analyze or disseminate root cause information.
The lack of suitable real-world data has led parts of the security research community to use "synthetic datasets" instead. 123 Unfortunately, constructing a suitable synthetic dataset is difficult. That said, researchers have been driven to using them despite their known deficiencies. For example, the so-called Lincoln Labs intrusion detection test dataset is known to be flawed: 124 "The corpus generated by Lincoln is unique in the Intrusion Detection arena and, as such, is the only substantial body of data that can be used for repeatable comparisons of IDS systems. At the same time, it may suffer from problems such as those noted above and may not provide results that reflect field performance. It appears to be used by researchers who were not part of the DARPA evaluation who should be aware of both its strengths and limitations." 125 Information about breaches is published, 126 but usually in the context of how many "records" were stolen. Information about the proximate causes of the breach is rarely published. Claims such as "a 120. CRISPAN 121. This is standard engineering practice, to build a version 1, a version 2, et cetera, and should not be read as a criticism of the approach or the first release of StackGuard. 
See generally id.
126. Generally, legislators have discussed publication as a punishment, a deterrent, and as a source of learning. sophisticated criminal" are common. Such claims do not allow us to learn. Rarely, there is a public investigation, such as into the 2017 Equifax breach. There, the company revealed that a failure to patch a server allowed an attacker to break in, but what went wrong is unclear. 127 In the case of Equifax, we seem to have an unusual amount of information about the failures. From the congressional hearing transcript:
Mr. Smith. " [T] he security team notified a wide range of people in the technology team who were responsible for then finding the vulnerability, applying the patch, and then, days later as is typical protocol, to deploy a technology scanner to go then look for the vulnerability, find the vulnerability, if it found a vulnerability it knew it was not patched. Both human deployment of the patch and the scanning deployment did not work. The protocol was followed." 128 Mr. Smith. "The human error was the individual who is responsible for communicating in the organization to apply the patch did not [so communicate]." 129 The Chairman. "So does that mean that that individual knew that the software was there and it needed to be patched and did not communicate that to the team that does the patching? Is that the heart of the issue here?" 130 Mr. Smith. "And I should clarify there that the rationale or the reason why the scanner or the technology piece did not locate the vulnerability is still under investigation by outside counsel." 131 This seems like quite a bit of information, but when we ask questions, answers are less forthcoming. Questions we can ask include: what was "the protocol?" In what way was it followed if "the individual who is responsible for communicating in the organization to apply the patch" did not do so? How many patches are 127 Moreover, we do not know how the breach was detected. We do not know how data was exfiltrated. We do not know what controls Equifax had in place at the time of the breach to detect a breach or to detect data loss.
If a corporate board were to ask a security expert to evaluate if the specific issues which happened at Equifax could happen to them, that expert could not give a complete answer given the limited data available.
Moreover, the information from which lessons might be learned from the breach is subject to several filters. Those filters include that the former CEO was discussing them, that there is an active law enforcement investigation, that many lawsuits have been filed, and that the questioners were not technically savvy.
There are certainly lessons which can be extracted from the testimony, but those lessons are a small subset of what might be learned. Those lessons must be extracted from the messy transcripts and many news stories, such as "The Equifax Hack Has the Hallmarks of State-Sponsored Pros." 132 The process of extracting lessons from many news stories is time consuming and expensive. We have no way to ask the question "is my vulnerability scanner better than Equifax's?" We cannot answer the question "what vulnerability scanner failed, and why" to start the comparison.
III. POLICY ENTREPRENEURSHIP CAN STIMULATE SCIENTIFIC EFFORTS
We recommend the creation of a Cyber Safety Reporting System to better equip companies to answer the hard questions discussed in Section II. This plan involves a mixture of industry involvement and policy entrepreneurship from government, and is one we think necessary to improving the flow of security information between defenders. In this section, we explore the policy entrepreneurship needed to create a CSRS, and why government would want this innovation. We also explore ways to structure a CSRS, and consider the benefits of a centralized reporting system. Policy entrepreneurship in this area would include two pillars. The first pillar is shaping industry incentives-considering participation as a factor in regulatory judgement when determining liability. The second would be protecting confidentiality. Most regulators today have a set of factors they take into account in determining liability. Those factors might be read to include participation in a near-miss program or experiment, or they might be extended.
The second pillar is explicitly shielding the confidentiality of reports and reporters. No organization wants to create a roadmap to its own prosecution by an overzealous prosecutor or regulator. Regulators could help by explicitly stating that experiments or activity in near-miss reporting would receive Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) protections, 133 and that they would not seek to test that protection.
A. The First Pillar: Encouraging Experimentation and Providing Leniency
As a matter of public policy, regulators should incentivize and remove roadblocks to experimentation, especially when dealing with a rapidly changing technology. 134 When designed to address regulatory challenges, such experimentation helps agencies and companies "earn regulatory authority." 135 The earned regulatory authority model asserts that authority is developed through "experimentation and effective administration," whereby innovative regulatory policies are rewarded with "more formal authority and budgetary support," often by Congress. 136 Regulators should encourage and be encouraged to explore new solutions to existing problems; in this case the use of leniency towards cybersecurity information sharing regimes can remove roadblocks to sharing.
Collection of information is essential to the success of the this proposed CSRS, however the liability concerns discussed in Section I can present a significant disincentive for companies to share. This principally stems from the risk that sharing of near-miss information can still result in liability for companies if the near-miss is actually an incident. Relevant enforcement agencies must therefore be willing to grant leniency for companies that choose to participate in the program, 135. Id. at 2013-14 (discussing earned authority in the context of ENERGY STAR, a program developed by the EPA, and later codified by congress, and the LEED building standard which is developed and overseen by a private organization, but which has been endorsed by several agencies).
136. Id. at 2067-68. and may do so through explicit statutory safe harbors (as in the case of CISA discussed above), memoranda of understanding committing to "avert their eyes," 137 regulatory forbearance, or prosecutorial discretion. Ultimately, a CSRS program might be codified in a statute to provide certainty of protection after experimentation to achieve an optimal structure.
By exploring how experimentation is implemented in other instances, we might better understand how to apply it to cybersecurity information sharing regimes.
In the case of ASRS, the FAA recognizes that "[t]he effectiveness of this program in improving safety depends on the free, unrestricted flow of information. . . ." 138 To help ensure that goal is met, the FAA delegated to NASA the job of collecting and analyzing near-miss information to protect anonymity including anonymity with respect to "the regulator," and generally increase the effectiveness of the program. 139 Companies can be more confident that they are protected from liability and thus be more willing to disclose the information to improve everyone's practices because of regulatory restrictions on the FAA's use of ASRS reports. 140 FTC enforcement actions often consider the general culpability of the company and whether it was helping or hindering the investigation. 141 Such prosecutorial discretion acts as both a carrot and a stick to motivate companies to behave well and disclose more information over the course of the investigation, or risk more severe penalties later. The FTC has also sometimes expressed a preference for self-regulation, and self-regulatory approaches may be easier to achieve than new regulation or legislation. 142 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) uses regulatory forbearance as a tool to achieve public policy goals in a flexible manner. The Telecommunications Act grants the FCC significant discretion as to whether it will forbear from some or all provisions of the Act. 143 This grant of flexibility was used most notably in the Open Internet Order whereby the Commission forbore from over 27 provisions of the Act and 700 different rules and regulations following its conception of "light-touch" regulation. 144 While some view forbearance with skepticism and alarm due to potential abuses, others have demonstrated that it is more appropriately seen as a form of implementation of statutes that Congress writes, filling in gaps in the law, and addressing perennial governance problems often anticipated by Congress itself. 145 The SEC maintains significant regulatory authority over the financial sector, both mandating industry behavior and disciplining bad actors. The SEC will often work in conjunction with the DOJ in pursuing joint or individual enforcement actions against persons for charges of insider trading. 146 This prosecutorial discretion in bringing actions allows the SEC to more efficiently allocate its scarce resources and to provide the flexibility necessary to ensure fairness in its enforcement process. 147 The SEC requires companies to operate compliance hotlines, and operates a whistleblower program for accounting fraud. At the same time, they are actively probing companies regarding their cyber practices and disclosures. 148 Recently, they have issued guidance that companies should "require employees to appropriately record, process, summarize and report up the corporate ladder any information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents that is potentially required to be disclosed in public filings." 149 Requirements for disclosure are being revisited, and large ($35m) fines have been imposed. 150 Financial institutions under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 are also mandated to protect consumers' personal information by requiring that "firms assess the risks they face, design a set of countermeasures, implement it, test it, and adjust the countermeasures as circumstances change." 151 While the authority of the SEC under these statutes is limited to the financial sector, a sector specific CSRS would nevertheless align with the desire to create a robust cybersecurity system for large companies and financial institutions.
The Department of Health and Human Services stands as a case where explicit regulatory authority should be met with greater experimentation. 152 Under the auspices of HIPAA and HITECH Act, HHS has formal regulatory authority to push improved cybersecurity practices. 153 Unfortunately, the HHS's "Security Rule is not clearly defined, has failed to incorporate relevant NIST guidance, and is poorly enforced." 154 Indeed, this failure in oversight forced the FTC to intervene in the case of LabMD as discussed in Section I above. 155 Congress reacted to the HHS's problems in passing the 21st century Cures Act to both empower the enforcement of greater information sharing by the inspector general, and to convene industry to create a model framework for securely sharing information. 156 Among these various examples, we see that government agencies are often willing to experiment with different regulatory levers to achieve public policy goals. Whether the lever be explicit in statute as in the case of CISA, less defined but congressionally blessed as in the case of the FCC or FTC, or the prosecutorial discretion common to all press-release/2018-71 ("Yahoo failed to properly investigate the circumstances of the breach and to adequately consider whether the breach needed to be disclosed to investors. The fact of the breach was not disclosed to the investing public until more than two years later…") [https://perma.cc/5LS5-5F9L]. Such regulatory entrepreneurship creates demand for ways to demonstrate good faith, and near-miss reporting could serve that purpose.
of the enforcement agencies, it should be no different in the case of cybersecurity information sharing, in order to optimize the amount of data available so that companies may learn to better protect themselves.
Regulatory judgement should nonetheless remain intact, with the caveat that good faith participation in the CSRS program would act as a factor in determining the culpability of the company should an incident occur. A key benefit of the CSRS program, much like its ASRS counterpart, is the ability to work ex ante to prevent problems rather than waiting until an incident has happened to make improvements. In this way, a company can act proactively to defend its systems and customers. The reporting of information must therefore be protected to ensure that companies disclose meaningful information freely. Such protection does not mean however, that a company is insulated from all consequences of a failure to adequately protect data, rather it seeks to encourage the production of data necessary to generate meaningful reports regarding how companies may improve their cybersecurity.
Without leniency, the risk of legal exposure from enforcement or other civil actions may be prohibitive for companies considering reporting, absent other countervailing incentives. This concern may be traversed by appropriately structuring the sharing regime. First, the willingness to participate in the program should be taken into account and factored into the leniency of the regulatory agency, as is the case of FTC. In the case of ASRS as noted above, the regulation specifically estops the FAA from using the data shared unless the data is otherwise not part of the ASRS program. 157 The ASRS model splits the work among several agencies to help ensure the data is protected, whereby NASA gathers and analyzes the data, but the FAA will have an option to use the data if the disclosure falls outside of specific definitions of the program. While not a perfect solution for companies which may inadvertently disclose something that can harm them, explicit protections can help companies to make informed decisions about what information they share and-if appropriately incentivizingallows information to flow more freely.
B. The Second Pillar: Confidentiality and Anonymity Must be Protected
Even with explicit protections, companies may still be worried about the sensitivity of the information being supplied and the possibility that such information would be subject to subpoenas or Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. In response, we can observe how ASIAS has handled such concerns. ASIAS is run by the 157. 14 C.F.R. § 91.25 (2018).
MITRE corporation, and is thus not subject to FOIA requests, 158 and while ASIAs has never been subpoenaed, MITRE notes that it has a plausible defense and that companies themselves are more likely to be subpoenaed for the information than MITRE is. 159 While not ironclad, a similar design for a CSRS could involve providing notice to the reporting company if the CSRS was ever subpoenaed. Even if the ultimate organization housing the ASRS program is a government entity such as NASA, an exemption to FOIA requests exists for confidential commercial information, 160 and another for those sharing certain cybersecurity data. 161 
C. Organizing a CSRS
There are many possible structures for the organization and funding of a new Cyber Safety Reporting System or Cyber Resilience Reporting System. There are two major questions: a home for the organization, and the source of support. As illustrated by the NASA-FAA partnership, they can be separate. 162 Organizationally, our choices are: stand up a new organization, host it in an existing nonprofit, or host it within a government agency. It could nominally exist within a for profit company, but that would be self-defeating. Similarly, creating a new organization adds to the challenges of getting started, and there are no obvious commensurate benefits. We explore a few of the options for housing the project below. This discussion is designed to illustrate opportunities, rather than to state that these are the only appropriate homes or authorities which could work. 161. Weiser, supra note 134, at 2067. 162. Some agencies are encouraging the reporting of near misses. For example, the New York Department of Financial Services says: "The Department believes that analysis of unsuccessful threats is critically important to the ongoing development and improvement of cybersecurity programs. . . Notice of the especially serious unsuccessful attacks may be useful to the Department . . . and the knowledge shared through such notice can be used to timely improve cybersecurity generally . Accordingly, Covered Entities are requested to notify the Department of those unsuccessful attacks that appear particularly significant. . ." However, they recognize that reporting a near miss to a regulator may raise concerns about being penalized: "The Department trusts that Covered Entities will exercise appropriate judgment as to which unsuccessful attacks must be reported and does not intend to penalize Covered Entities for the exercise of honest, good faith judgment. 163. Additionally, we only discuss existing authorities, but note that learning from near misses does not fall cleanly into established policy battles, and it may represent a rare opportunity for bi-partisan cooperation.
Which regulatory agencies would want to see such a program flourish, and secondarily, have clear authority to fund or operate such a program? The FAA determined in the 1970s that the ASRS, designed to learn from incidents and near misses, would enhance the safety of the aviation system. 164 In an analogous manner, the FTC can improve cyber for consumer-facing applications, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for critical infrastructure, or the SEC for improving disclosure of cybersecurity practices to investors. This structure might also be best housed in a scientific agency such as NIST in an analogous fashion to the ASRS program.
DHS already oversees multiple regimes aimed at improving critical infrastructure cybersecurity information sharing, with a core mission focused on safeguarding and securing cyberspace, 165 and remedying information shortfalls. 166 DHS currently acts as the overseeing agency to the Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT), a program which provides protection to federal agencies through intrusion detection and prevention, exchanges critical cybersecurity information, and analyzes emerging cyber threats among other activities. 167 Moreover, President Obama's Executive Order 13636 directed DHS to create the Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community (C3), a public-private partnership led by DHS to facilitate critical infrastructure management using the NIST framework. 168 The Emergency Services Sector (ESS) Information-Sharing Initiative, which coordinates an information sharing and analysis center and stakeholders for effective information dissemination further illustrates DHS's mission. 169 Given this well-developed mission to share, DHS could serve as an excellent home for a CSRS system.
NIST is a respected scientific agency with expertise in cybersecurity, issuing many standards. NIST is probably better than other government agencies from the perspective of multinational companies, but suffered a reputational blow in 2014 for its close collaboration with NSA. 170 The funding question is complex; there are single funder models, and multi-funder models. There are a number of agencies, including DHS, FTC, and NIST who have a direct and broad interest in the sorts of guidance a CSRS could offer. Funding does not need to be dramatic. The likely initial size and funding of an experiment tilt towards a single funder. It could well make sense to host it within a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) within nonprofits such as MITRE, SRI or RAND, which currently operate FFRDCs and have a reputation for scientific and operational excellence. It also makes sense for the organization to be structured in a way that takes advantage of the protections offered to information sharing and analysis organizations 171 Ultimately, agencies which may bring actions against organizations for breaches will need to either promulgate rules to provide specific protections, or will need to put out memoranda of understanding to give companies notice and comfort as to the expectation of protection from sharing.
The foregoing reasons explain why incident or near-miss reporting is a good idea. We now examine why our proposalvoluntary reporting, along the lines of the aviation safety system-is better than other alternatives.
D. Single Reporting Regime
Assume that we are correct, that near-miss reporting is important. A single repository is superior to multiple ones, for a number of reasons.
One important reason is that the precise information collected will be important. A recent Inspector-General report on informationsharing from the Department of Homeland Security, pursuant to the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, 172 noted this issue in a slightly different context: 173 "By design, Automated Indicator Sharing and Cyber Information Sharing and Collection Program feeds have different methods to populate information and therefore exhibit considerable disparity in data quality… This enables the analysts to provide recipients with more contextual information for determining the appropriate course of action to mitigate potential threats against their networks." 174 While it could be argued that having multiple repositories (and hence multiple questionnaires) will result in at least some good ones being developed, that same argument implies that others will be not so good. We believe that it is better to expend effort on a single high-quality site.
A central archive is also more likely to provide the broader view needed in today's environment. 175 With multiple repositories, analysts would need to poll them all to understand what is going on; furthermore, collecting somewhat different data from each site will vastly increase the analytic difficulties, 176 and attackers are unlikely to organize their activities to comport with our organizational battle lines. If some data is unavailable, analysis will be hurt. DHS suffers from precisely this problem because classified and unclassified data items are stored separately. 177 Finally, we note that the success of this scheme depends on incentivized cooperation, and hence on finding the right balance between trust and desire to receive the benefit. It's likely that investment in trust-building activity, including outreach and ongoing delivery of confidentiality and anonymity will be required. If there are multiple repositories, some are likely to be more trusted than others; the less-trusted ones will likely receive fewer reports and less informative reports.
E. Analytic Regimes
By contrast, there is no a priori reason why there cannot be multiple analyses. Indeed, multiple analytic perspectives can be valuable, in that different researchers can take different approaches and derive different insights. The problem, however, is that the collected data may be believed by the organization to be somewhat sensitive. 178 Furthermore, near-miss data is often less sensitive. Had Equifax fended off the attackers, they could have reported "danger of https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017-11/OIG-18-10-Nov17_0.pdf [https:// perma.cc/RJ4E-2FD5].
174. Id. 175. Id. at 4 ("contextual data [is] needed to effectively defend against ever-evolving threats").
176. See id. at 13. 177. Id. at 13 ("This separation restricted the analysts' ability to compile a complete situational awareness of a potential threat.").
178. See supra Section II (but without experience in collecting near-miss data, it remains to be seen how organizations will see it, once the newness wears off). a failure of a vulnerability or patch scanner," or the "danger of a large exposure of personal information," as opposed to "data on 145 million people was exposed." The latter is far more revelatory: not many organizations have that much data. There are questions of how the data is gathered and processed, and also, questions of how analyses are released. ASRS and ASIAS both take the approach that data is gathered confidentially, and analysis is released after careful anonymization.
One tempting approach is to gather and release anonymized data-replace identifiers with arbitrary different ones. 179 In general, this approach is unlikely to work well. Apart from the normal risks of anonymization, 180 the data we urge be collected will contain implicit and explicit identifying information, information that is difficult to anonymize or redact.
Some of the issue relates to free-form text fields. These are widely recognized to be a problem; HIPAA, for example, requires that they be anonymized as well. 181 But there is also implicit identifying information in, e.g., a description of the reporter's network topology. 182 
See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1703 (2010) ("Imagine a database packed with sensitive information about many people . . . . Now imagine that the office that maintains this database needs to place it in long-term storage or disclose it to a third party without compromising the privacy of the people tracked. To eliminate the privacy risk, the office will anonymize the data, consistent with contemporary, ubiquitous data-handling practices. First, it will delete personal identifiers like names and social security numbers. Second, it will modify other categories of information that act like identifiers in the particular context-the hospital will delete the names of next of kin, the school will excise student ID numbers, and the bank will obscure account numbers."). Figure 7 shows three sample backbones overlaid on a map of the United States"). While these are in general not public knowledge, it is often possible for knowledgeable individuals to deduce or even measure them. Id. Again, this sort of risk is recognized by the HIPAA anonymization guidance. 183 Ideally, as much of the information as possible will be in structured form rather than as text; this will permit automated queries, use of machine learning techniques, etc. 184 To be sure, it may be possible to anonymize a structured subset of reports. Methods of incident data anonymization have been developed. 185 Again, though, de-anonymization is often possible if some extra information is available. 186 It is worth noting that the minimum population size considered adequate for suitable anonymization under HIPAA is 20,000 people; 187 there are not likely to be nearly as many records in any useful time frame.
See
A third possibility is to use an anonymization technique such as differential privacy. 188 This offers mathematically provable privacy guarantees, but is only suitable for certain sorts of statistical queries; it is not at all useful for analyzing free-text reports.
We conclude from these techniques that release of confidential data is unlikely to balance privacy with performing interesting analyses. The conclusion, then, is that a single agency, and one with sufficient scientific expertise to process the data, should be responsible for all analyses. Fairly obviously, it would be easier if this agency were also the party that collected the data. Outside researchers could, perhaps, be invited in to work with the in-house researchers, but this would have to be done pursuant to suitable non-disclosure agreements and perhaps prepublication review of any resulting papers. 189 183. See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 181, at §2.6 ("A higher risk 'feature' is one that is found in many places and is publicly available. These are features that could be exploited by anyone who receives the information."). 189. Presumably, the classified networks would have their own incident reporting system and repository; as with the DHS effort, the classified and unclassified data would have to be stored separately. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR-GENERAL, supra note 173. It might be useful to have a single analytic system that could process both classes of data. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR-GENERAL, supra note 173 ("By acquiring a cross-domain solution, DHS can provide more detailed cyber information, improve the quality and usefulness of cyber threat reports, and correlate cyber threat indicators and defensive measures across its unclassified and classified environments.").
F. Light-Touch Cooperation
While a mandatory regulatory scheme might be preferable, 190 such an approach seems unlikely today. Even apart from the current political tensions, there is a profound partisan divide on the desirability and utility of regulations. We are thus suggesting a "lighttouch" voluntary scheme. While we do not know for certain that there will be cooperation, we are cautiously optimistic. The same sort of approach has succeeded in aviation and many other fields; 191 we believe that it will help here.
The proof, of course, will be in whether the resulting information actually helps. Based on DHS's results with threat information, we suspect that it will. 192 We also interviewed representatives of selected DHS components and Federal entities-consumers of this information-and found that they generally used this information to improve their network security controls. However, they also used the cyber threat indicators to detect malicious actors, and mitigate anomalies and possible threats to their networks.
The key, of course, will be the published analyses: is enough information disseminated, to the right people, and quickly enough? CONCLUSION It is clear that there is a serious cybersecurity problem. While the ultimate solutions will likely have to be technical-neither criminal hackers nor hostile nations will vanish any time soon-today's efforts are hampered by a lack of information. We can augment today's "indicator-centric" information sharing schemes with new types of analysis. A voluntary and incentivized scheme focused on the collection, analysis, and publication of lessons is an important part of how other fields improve their safety and security. The complexity of gathering information about real cyber incidents leads us to suggest an effort focused on near misses. Experience in other fields has shown that trying to bring voluntary reports to regulatory agencies often fails.
Public policy must balance between ensuring the public is protected, while providing sufficient incentives for information gathering, analysis, and publication. On the one hand, companies must be provided with sufficient certainty that their disclosures will not come back to haunt them, but should not be able to avoid liability by virtue of their disclosures.
Against the backdrop of liability for data breaches, the question becomes obvious: how long can we keep saying "that was close!"? Without an effective cybersecurity plan, companies risk increasingly serious backlash from government and consumers. However, these same companies lack the visibility into ongoing threats which other similarly situated companies may have successfully prevented. As a result, companies make the same mistakes repeatedly and inadvertently subject themselves to massive liability. The development of a near-miss reporting system seeks to alleviate company stress from attackers and threats of liability by incentivizing companies to share what they experience. 193 
A. Industry Should Experiment With Near-Miss Reporting
Industry should take steps to experiment with near-miss reporting. That includes creating working definitions of accident and near miss, crafting forms and databases to hold the input, and experimentally processing them to inform discussion of effort. If a new organization were to stand up to collect data, how much would it get? We could run an experiment to find out.
There has been some work on definitions, 194 but more work with the goal of specifying near misses would help set minds at ease. If industry creates a working definition, that definition could later be adopted into law or incorporated by the information reporting agency to allow for greater clarity in what creates liability for the reporting entity.
B. Regulators Should Reward Reporting of Near Misses
Regulators should create incentives and remove roadblocks to learning from our mistakes 195 . The challenges of securing systems today are obvious, and they will get worse. Initially, this should be incentives for experimentation as needed, with a clear path to building systematic capabilities for securing our society. 195. The precise nature of such rewards varies across disciplines. In cybersecurity, it may vary from reduced penalties to significant rewards for well executed reporting of interesting misses. Most important is an incentive which is sufficient to generate a norm of reporting without creating moral hazards.
